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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Court on this question. The problem with Powers is that its limited discussion
of the issues does not give the Missouri attorney adequate criteria by which to
judge an interest in a pension plan in a dissolution case. What is clear is that
until an appellate court adequately deals with the question, only those
pension rights that are considered vested are divisible as marital property in
Missouri.
JOHN W. SHAW
DUE PROCESS: APPLICABILITY TO
UTILITY RATES
State ex rel. Jackson County v. Public Service Commission'
On August 5, 1974, the Missouri Public Service Company submitted to
the Missouri Public Service Commission an increased rate schedule for
electric service provided to its Missouri customers. The resulting rate
increase caused a constitutional challenge to Missouri's rate-increase
procedures.
Missouri statutes provide for two means of effecting utility rate
changes-the "file and suspend" method2 and the "complaint" method. 3
The "file and suspend" method of revising rates allows the utility company
to file new rates with the PSC and, unless they are "suspended" by the
Commission, the new rates will go into effect thirty days after they are filed.
The Commission is authorized to notify the public of the proposed rate
increase and can also hold hearings on the necessity for such increase, but
neither "notice" nor "hearing" is required before approval of the new rates.
The consumers challenged the validity of the "file and suspend" method as a
denial of due process under the fourteenth amendment. The Missouri
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the method.
The supreme court stated that the due process test consisted of two
steps: first, a determination of whether there is a protected interest, and
1. 532 S.W.2d 20 (Mo. En Banc 1975).
2. § 393.140(1 1), RSMo 1969.
3. § 386.390, RSMo 1969. The complaint method provides that complaints as
to the reasonableness of any rates may be made by consumers to the PSC. The
complaint must be signed by the mayor, the president, chairman of the board of
aldermen, or the majority of the council of any town or city that complains or by not
less than twenty-five consumers or purchasers of such utility service. Once a com-
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second, if there is a protected interest, a determination of whether the
interest of the state outweighs the interest of the individual. The court stated
that the first part of the test was determinative, and held that the Due Process
Clause was inapplicable because there was no protected "property" interest
in existing levels of utility rates. A concurring opinion of Judge Bardgett and
a dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Seiler stated that although a consumer
may not have a property right in a specific rate, he does have a right not to be
charged unreasonable rates, and he should be afforded notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard prior to implementation of the increased rates.
In deciding whether the Due Process Clause has been violated by the
"file and suspend" method, it must first be determined that such rate
increase procedure is state action, for the fourteenth amendment applies
only to actions by the state.4 A factual determination must be made on a
utility by utility approach applying established tests.' In Jackson v. Metropoli-
tan Edison Co.,6 the United States Supreme Court held that certain activities
of a particular public utility were not state action. The test for state action
established in that case was whether there is a "sufficiently close nexus
between the State and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that
the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself."7 In
Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co.,8 the Eighth Circuit set up seven considera-
tions to determine if a regulated company's actions are to be considered state
action. 9 In light of these Ihrke considerations, it appears there is a sufficient
relation between the rate increase procedures of Missouri public utilities and
the state of Missouri for those procedures to be considered "state action."10
Once state action is deemed to exist, the measure of protection afforded
the individual's interest must be determined. Originally, protection of an
interest by the Due Process Clause depended upon whether that interest was
4. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., - U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 449
(1975); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelly v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
5. Compare Ihrke v. Northern States Power Co., 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1972)
and Condosta v. Vermont Elec. Coop., Inc., 400 F. Supp. 358 (D. Vt. 1975) with
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., - U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 449 (1975) and Lucas v.
Wisconsin Elec. Power Co., 446 F.2d 638 (7th Cir. 1972).
6. - U.S. -, 95 S. Ct. 449 (1974).
7. Id. at -, 95 S. Ct. at 453.
8. 459 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1972).
9. Those considerations are: (1) Is the entity subject to close regulation by a
statutorily created body? (2) Must regulations be filed with the regulatory body as a
condition of the entity's operation? (3) Must the regulations be approved to be
effective? (4) Is the entity given total or partial monopoly by the regulatory body? (5)
Does the regulatory body control the rates charged or the specific services offerred?
(6) Are the actions of the entity subject to review by the regulatory body? (7) Does the
regulation of the entity permit it to perform acts which it may not otherwise perform
without violating state law? 459 F.2d at 568-69.
10. See Mayes, Constitutional Restrictions on Termination of Services by Privately
Owned Public Utilities, 39 Mo. L. REv. 205 (1974).
1977]
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characterized as a "right" or as a "privilege."" If the interest was deemed a
"right," procedural safeguards applied; but if the interest was considered to
be a "privilege" there was no due process protection afforded that interest.
This arbitrary distinction was eventually rejected by the Supreme Court,
and other considerations became relevant.' 2 The Court developed what has
become known as the "entitlement theory" to determine if an interest is a
sufficient "property" interest to be subject to procedural safeguards. Board
of Regents v. Roth5 summarized that test:
[Property interests] are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law-rules or understandings
that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to
those benefits. 14
Under this entitlement theory, the Court has extended protection to
interests other than just actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money.
The Court has extended due process protection to the reception of welfare
benefits under statutory and administrative standards defining eligibility;15
to interests in continued employment by college professors where that
employment fs based on tenure provisions, 16 contracts,17 or even implied
promises of continued employment;' 8 and to revocations of a prisoner's
good-time credits accumulated under state law.' 9 The Supreme Court in
Arnett v. Kennedy20 may have placed a limit on the entitlement theory of
protectable interests. In that case, a civil service employee was discharged
before there had been a hearing as to the necessity of his discharge. Three
justices who voted in the majority recognized that the non-probationary
federal employee had a legal entitlement to continued employment because
the Lloyd-La Follette Act granted such employee the right not to be removed
save for cause, but they also stated that the act that created the entitlement
had limited it. That act specifically provided for a post-termination hearing
and thus established the due process limits of the entitlement. However, the
two other justices who voted with the majority rejected the idea that the
statute that creates the entitlement also limits it.
11. See, e.g., Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd341 U.S.
918 (1951).
12. "[T]his Court now has rejected the concept that Constitutional rights turn
upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a 'right' or as a'privilege.' "
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365,374 (1971). See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Goldbergv. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254(1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
13. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
14. Id. at 577 (emphasis added).
15. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
16. Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
17. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
18. Connell v. Higgenbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971).
19. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
20. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
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The entitlement theory does not appear to be the only test used by the
Supreme Court to determine what is "property." If a person can show that
he has suffered some sort of serious loss, the Court seems willing to extend
due process protection to that interest. In Morrissey v. Brewer21 the standard
used to determine that an interest was protectable was that there had been a
"grievous loss"; Board of Regents v. Roth 22 -"serious damage" to reputation
and standing; Bell v. Burson2 3-"important interests" of licensees. The
recent decision of Goss v. Lopez24 seemed to combine the entitlement theory
and the grievous loss theory of protectable interests. The majority of five
held that students facing a temporary suspension from school were entitled
to procedural safeguards because free public education was a legal entitle-
ment created by Ohio statutes.' In addition to pointing to the legal entitle-
ment of a free public education, the majority also seemed to predicate their
decision on the nature of the deprivation-"education is perhaps the most
important function of state and local governments."'2 6 The dissent conceded
that there appeared to be an entitlement to free public education but felt that
that alone was insufficient to confer protection. They concluded that a
ten-day suspension from school was not such a "serious" deprivation as to
require protection.2 7
Several cases have extended procedural safeguards to termination of
utility services. 28 These cases seem to be based on the "serious loss" theory of
protectable interests. The rationale of these decisions is that termination of
utility services would be a serious loss to the consumer because consumers
rely greatly on their electric, gas, and water services.29 Although the utility
service may be a protected interest, several state and federal cases which
have addressed the issue have determined that the ratepaid for that service is
not subject to procedural safeguards. In Sellers v. Iowa Power & Light Co.,30 a
case relied upon by the Missouri Supreme Court in Jackson County, plaintiffs
claimed that a rate increase without prior hearing violated due process
21. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
22. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
23. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
24. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
25. OHIo REv. CODE §§ 3313A8, 3313.64, 3313.66 (1972).
26. 419 U.S. at576, 95 S. Ct. at 737 (Quoting Brownv. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954)).
27. "As it is difficult to think of any less consequential infringement than
suspension of a junior high school student for a single day, it is equally difficult to
perceive any principled limit to the new reach of procedural due process." _I& at 587,
95 S. Ct. at 749.
28. See, e.g., Condosta v. Vermont Elec. Coop., Inc., 400 F. Supp. 358 (D. Vt.
1975); Palmer v. Columbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Davis v.
Weir, 328 F. Supp. 317 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
29. "That the plaintiff relies upon electric service in his daily life cannot be
questioned; his ability to obtain heat in the winter, refrigeration and cooking of his
food, and light by which he can see at night is denendent upon his receipt of electric
service." Condosta v. VermontElec. Coop., Inc., 400 F. Supp. 358,365 (D. Vt. 1975).
30. 372 F. Supp. 1169 (S.D. Iowa 1974).
1977]
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because they were deprived of the money required to pay the increase. The
Iowa ,district court did not categorically deny a property interest in the
present level of rates31 but stated that the plaintiffs' claim was too broadly
stated to be protected by the fourteenth amendment. The Georgia district
court also has refused to recognize a property interest in money required to
pay for rate increases.3 2 The district court acknowledged that "an increase in
rates means a deprivation of a monetary sum" and that "the interest. . . is
more than an 'abstract need or desire' for lower rates"33 but denied protec-
tion to the interest because it was too general and was shared by "practically
everyone." To refuse protection to an interest because it is shared by
"practically everyone," seems contrary to the "grievous loss" theory. A
deprivation of some "general interest" would injure a larger number of
people which logically should bolster the argument for protection of that
interest.
In Holt v. Yonce,34 the South Carolina district court refused to recognize
a property interest in the rates paid for utilities. The summary affirmance of
this decision by the United States Supreme Court seems to indicate that
Court's approval of the proposition that a utility rate is not property subject
to due process requirements though the Court's rationale was not disclosed.
Although there may be no legitimate entitlement of consumers in any
specific rate paid for utilities, it seems that the Missouri consumer does have
a protectable interest in being charged a reasonable rate for utilities. Using the
entitlement test set out in Roth, in which the entitlement must be created by a
statute, rule, contract, etc., the Missouri consumer has a statutorily created
entitlement to reasonable rates.3 5 Missouri statutes require that all charges
deranded by utilities be "just and reasonable"36 and, therefore, it seems the
Missouri consumer is entitled to notice and opportunity to contest the
"reasonableness" of a proposed rate increase. However, if the reasoning of
the plurality opinion of Arnett v. Kennedy37 (i.e., the statute that creates the
entitlement may also limit it) is applied, the Missouri statutes may specifically
limit that entitlement because a statutory remedy is afforded the con-
sumer-the consumer can object to rates using the "complaint method."
The consumers in State ex rel. Jackson County might also claim a legitimate
entitlement to the specific rate originally set by the Public Service Commis-
sion for Missouri Public Service Company because the order of the Commis-
sion setting the original rate to be charged by that company included a two
year moratorium on further rate increases.38 Based on Roth, this ruling of
31. Id. at 1172.
32. Georgia Power Project v. Georgia Power Co., 409 F. Supp. 332 (N.D. Ga.
1975).
33. Id. at 340.
34. 370 F. Supp. 374 (D.S.C. 1973), aff'd mem., 415 U.S. 969 (1974).
35. § 393.130(1), RSMO 1969.
36. Id.
37. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
38. 532 S.W.2d at 23.
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the PSC seems to create an entitlement in that specific rate during the two
year moratorium. The Missouri Supreme Court decided that the
moratorium set by the PSC could also be removed by that body but did not
discuss the issue of whether the two year moratorium created a property
interest in that specific rate.
Even assuming utility rates are protectable property interests under the
Due Process Clause, sufficient "process" may have been afforded Missouri
consumers. Morrissey v. Brewer3 9 indicated that a determination of the
amount of process that is "due" involves a balancing of interests: "[D]ue
process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands."4 0 The consumers' opportunity to challenge rates
through the "complaint method" may be all due process required in this
"particular situation." Two state cases have held that due process require-
ments had been met where consumers could file rate complaints with the
state regulatory bodies.4 1 Also, it could be determined that due process had
been satisfied because the Missouri public's interests are adequately pro-
tected by the Missouri Public Service Commission. Several Missouri cases
have recognized that one purpose of that Commission is to protect the
public.42
It appears that the Missouri Supreme Court reached the right conclu-
sion for the wrong reason. Based on the Missouri statutes, the consumers in
State ex rel. Jackson County did have a legitimate claim of entitlement to
reasonable rates. However, sufficient procedural safeguards were afforded
consumers by their opportunity to file a complaint with the Public Service
Commission and the representation of the consumers' interests by that body.
Since the United States Supreme Court's 5-4 decision in Goss v. Lopez,
43
Justice Douglas, who voted with the majority in Goss, has been replaced by
Justice Stevens from the Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit. Justice
Stevens, it appears, may have the swing vote in determining how far to
extend procedural safeguards. Based on several Seventh Circuit decisions in
which Justice Stevens participated,' it appears that he has adopted the same
39. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
40. Id. at 481.
41. Consumers' Organization for Fair Energy Equality, Inc. v. Department of
Pub. Utils., 335 N.E.2d 341 (Mass. 1975); In re Allied Power & Light Co., 350 A.2d
360 (Vt. 1975).
42. See, e.g., State ex rel. Valley Sewage Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 515 S.W.2d
845 (Mo. App., D.K.C.11974); State ex rel. St. Louis v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 335 Mo.
448, 73 S.W.2d 393 (En Banc 1934).
"[T]he guiding star of the public service commission law and the dominating
purpose to be accomplished by such regulation [of public utilities] is the promotion
and conservation of the interests and convenience of the public." State ex rel. Crown
Coach Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 238 Mo. App. 287, 298, 179 S.W.2d 123, 128
(K.C. Ct. App. 1944) (emphasis added).
43. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
44. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hahn v. Revis, 520 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1975);
Field v. Boyle, 503 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1974); Miller v. School Dist. No. 167,500 F.2d
19771
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